top of page

Mysite Group

Public·5 members

Dgun-840 Driver Windows 10

We were unable to find drivers for your product. Try manually selecting your operating system. If your operating system is not listed then HP may not provide driver support for your product with that operating system.

Dgun-840 driver windows 10

Download File:

Note: Adding permissions must be done within the first 30 minutes of installing the driver. If the driver was installed outside of the time window, please uninstall and reinstall the driver.

Note: When you add an item in Input Monitoring a message will appear notifying you the application must quit before changes will work. Please do so, however, you must restart your computer after this as the tablet and driver will not work correctly until after the restart.

Philmore Alexander and Herbert Hines, both adults, are cousins. (H.C. Hines Depo. at 42.) Philmore Alexander is the father of Javona, LaKeisha, and LaQuita Alexander. (Philmore Alexander Depo. at 6.) Herbert Hines is the father of Tammy and Tanisha Hines. (H.C. Hines Depo. at 33.) Edward J. Vines is the father of Carnitta Vines. (Carnitta Vines Depo. at 7.) On the night of March 1, 2000, the Plaintiffs, with the exception of Edward J. Vines,[8] attended a rap music concert at the WSU Ervin J. Nutter Center ("Nutter Center"). (Philmore Alexander Depo. at 31, 37.) They rode in a Chevrolet Suburban. (Id. at 33.) The driver and passenger side windows of the Suburban had a custom tint to them, and the side-panel and back windows had a darker factory tint. (Id. at 38-41.) At the time, Javona Alexander was 16 years old (Javona Alexander Depo. at 6), LaKiesha Alexander was 13 (LaKiesha Turner Depo. at 7),[9] LaQuita Alexander was about 10 (Philmore Alexander Depo. at 6), Tammy Hines was about 9 (H.C. Hines Depo. at 33), Tanisha Hines was 7 or 8 (Tanisha Hines Depo. at 6),[10] and Carnitta Vines was 19. (Carnitta Vines Depo. at 6.)

Because of the report of weapons, Officers Cyr and Shuman conducted what they term a "felony traffic stop." (Cyr Aff. 14; Shuman Depo. at 130-131.) The stop was not based on any observed violation of traffic laws, and they did not call in the license plate number to their dispatch to have it checked. (Shuman Depo. at 99.) Communicating in loud voices and perhaps even through a bullhorn, they commanded the Plaintiffs to stick their hands out of the windows. (Philmore Alexander Depo. at 53; H.C. Hines Depo. at 75; Shuman Depo. at 89-91.) Officer Cyr was shouting at the Plaintiffs from his position on the rear, driver's side of the Suburban, while Officer Shuman was shouting at them from his position on the rear, passenger's side. (Shuman Depo. at 89-90.) The Plaintiffs were shouting out the window that they had children in the Suburban, and inquired in a rather panicked state into why they were being stopped. (Philmore Alexander Depo. at 51 & 54; H.C. Hines Depo. at 77.) LaKeisha Alexander remembers Herbert Hines shouting "Don't shoot, it's a cell phone," referring to a phone that was in his hand. (LaKeisha Turner Depo. at 32, 33; see also Cyr Aff. 16.) After being told to put their hands out the windows, they were told to exit the vehicle. (Philmore Alexander Depo. at 51; Shuman Depo. at 92; Cyr Aff. 18-19.)

Herbert Hines, after being told to "get his ass out of the vehicle," exited on the driver's side and realized that several officers had their guns drawn on him. (H.C. Hines Depo. at 78, 89.) Officer Cyr told him to get on the ground. (Id.; Cyr Aff. 20.) When he mentioned that he had a bad back, the officers yelled at him again to "get his ass on the ground." (H.C. Hines at 79, 90.) He then dropped to his knees, at which point he was handcuffed by Officer Cyr. (Id. at 80; Cyr Aff. H 24.) In the process of getting on his knees, Herbert Hines hurt his back. (H.C. Hines Depo. at 80.) Once handcuffed, he was assisted to his feet by Officer Cyr and *828 escorted to the transport van. (Id. at 82; Cyr Aff. 25.) He asked what he had done, but did not receive a response. (H.C. Hines Depo. at 83.)

With respect to the issue of whether Officers Cyr and Shuman had reasonable suspicion to stop the Plaintiffs in their Suburban and conduct a brief search for unlawfully possessed weapons, the Court believes that they did. A police officer may formulate his or her reasonable suspicion based on information received *834 from fellow officers. See Houston, 174 F.3d at 814; McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 993-94 (6th Cir.1997), cert, denied, 523 U.S. 1050, 118 S. Ct. 1370, 140 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1998). In Houston, the officer who conducted the vehicle stop and weapons search was acting pursuant to the radio broadcast from his partner who had described only the taillights of the car which he (the partner) believed was being driven by a suspect in the purported "shooting." 174 F.3d at 812. While there was plenty of reason to suspect that a shooting took place at the bar, the only information which the reporting officer had linking the driver of the speeding car to the purported shooting was the driver's act of speeding away. Id. at 813. Moreover, the only information which the detaining officer had linking the car which he actually stopped to the car his partner had observed speeding away was his partner's description of the speeding car's taillights and his misunderstanding that the suspect car was a certain number of cars ahead of his own cruiser. Id. at 812.[15] Despite having only what was, in hindsight, inadequate information, the Sixth Circuit held that both officers acted with "reasonable suspicion" in reporting, pursuing, and stopping the respective vehicles which they thought were occupied by a person involved in the purported shooting. Id. at 813-14.

To the extent the Plaintiffs argue that the intensity of the search was more intrusive than necessary, the Court need only consider the potential result had they conducted a less intrusive search. Had Officer Mader's report been accurate, to approach the Suburban, darkened as it was by the nighttime hour of the stop and its tinted glass windows, in a more casual manner, i.e., without guns drawn, might well have been foolish. The Plaintiffs try to depict the Defendant officers' actions as excessive for a "traffic stop" (Doc. # 36 at 18; Doc. # 37 at 12), but the truth of the matter is that this was not a traffic stop, and the departmental rules relating to such, be they those of Fairborn or of WSU, were inapplicable. "[W]hen police officers reasonably fear that suspects are armed and dangerous, they may order the suspects out of a car and may draw their weapons when those steps are `reasonably necessary for the protection of the officers.' " Houston, 174 F.3d at 814-15 (quoting United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir.1993)). Nothing more than this occurred in this situation. It is unfortunate, *836 very much so, that children were involved, but that they were so does not make the officers' actions any less reasonable.

Were the underlying facts to reveal that Sgt. Baker received his tip from an anonymous tipster over the telephone, and acted solely upon the tip in notifying Officer Mader of such information, the Court might agree that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether he acted reasonably. Yet, such is not the case, and the lower federal courts have recognized a significant difference between the factual predicate of J.L. and a situation such as that at issue herein, where the informants, albeit unknown, were observed in person by the officer relying on the information. For instance, the Third Circuit held that where the police were looking for two robbery suspects, it was lawful for them to rely upon information provided by an unknown man who approached them and told them that the two suspects for whom they were looking had just boarded a bus, despite the fact that they did not ask the man for any personal information about himself, including his name, or the basis for the information he gave. See Robertson, 305 F.3d at 166, 168-69. "No doubt in perfect hindsight and with more time, Captain Sullivan might well have asked the *838 bystander more questions. But elaboration or corroboration in these circumstances can delay-and even terminate-effective pursuit.... If Captain Sullivan had waited to determine if the van driver had a basis for his statement, the fleeing suspects may well have escaped. It is legally insignificant that Robertson [one of the suspects] was not ultimately identified by the victim as the armed robber." Id. at 168-69. 350c69d7ab


Welcome to the group! You can connect with other members, ge...

bottom of page